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The Chaos of Smith
Steven A. Ramirez*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Smith v. Van Gorkom1 decision received mixed reviews, at
best, when it debuted twenty years ago.2  One commentator thought
the decision “atrocious.”3  Another called it “one of the worst deci-
sions in the history of corporate law.”4  This article takes a different
approach.5  I argue the decision was sound.6  If there is anything atro-
cious about Smith, it is its legacy.7  Special interest influence took grip
of corporate governance in America in the wake of Smith and drasti-
cally altered shareholder rights in a most pernicious fashion by evis-
cerating the duty of care through insulating legislation.8  This
diminution in shareholder rights is not costless, and the economic drag
associated with sub-optimal corporate governance continues to im-
pose real costs today.9  Indeed, Smith ushered in an age of CEO pri-
* Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law.  I dedicate this article to my
Business Associations students at Washburn University School of Law from 1996 through 2005.
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Barry F. Schwartz & James G. Wiles, Trans Union: Neither “New” Law nor “Bad” Law,
10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429, 429 n.2 (1985).
3. See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (1985).
4. Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW.
1437, 1455 (1985).
5. Even those arguing for a kinder assessment of Smith are harsh regarding its central
finding that the duty of care was breached under the facts of the case. See Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, A Kinder, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Less Celebrated Legacies, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 595, 596 (2002) (arguing that although Van Gorkom was wrong, it correctly
resolved certain ancillary issues).
6. Professors Elson and Thompson have recognized that Smith was a “wake up call to
passive boards that had been the norm in the decades prior to the decision.”  Charles M. Elson
& Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom’s Legacy: The Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraints
and the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 583 (2002).  Still, they con-
clude that the decision was “ultimately misdirected.” Id. at 593; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 54 (2002)
(“[T]he oft-repeated law and economics critique of Van Gorkom appears overblown. . . . [T]here
is a rational basis for the seemingly formalistic procedures mandated by that opinion.”).
7. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.1.7 (2003) (stating that, in re-
sponse to Smith, state legislatures enacted insulating statutes permitting the obliteration of the
duty of care within the corporation charter, with Delaware leading the way).
8. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 SW. L.J. 919, 929 (1988).
In general, superior investor protection enhances a firm’s ability to raise external financing and
thereby supports greater economic growth. See, e.g., Rui Castro, Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn
MacDonald, Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth, 119 Q.J. ECON.
1131, 1131-35, 1166-67 (2004).
9. Steven A. Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation (and Race) in America: Can Law (and
Professionalization) Fix Minor Problems of Externalization, Internalization and Governance, 79
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (positing that a macroeconomically optimal corporation
would not externalize costs, would exploit profitable mass investment opportunities, and would
minimize agency costs); see also Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Ro¨ell, Corporate Govern-
ance and Control, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1 (George M. Constanti-
nides, Milton Harris & Rene´ M. Stulz eds., 2003) (stating that corporate governance must stem
self-dealing by managers and that soaring executive compensation in the United States is diffi-
cult to justify).
343
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macy in American corporate governance, ensconced in law and
buttressed by raw political power.10
This article posits that the most remarkable element of the deci-
sion in Smith is the court’s disposition of a motion for reargument
filed by one individual defendant-director.11  This oft-ignored gem12
explains the entire decision; indeed, it demonstrates the “Chaos”13
governing the law, particularly in the context of complex legal and
regulatory systems such as corporate governance that are permeated
by special interest influence.14  The paradox of Smith is that, while it
was perceived to heighten the duty of care applicable to directors of
corporations, it in fact operated to dilute the obligations of the direc-
tors.15  I argue that the decision in Smith placed corporate governance
on the path to a CEO-centric model, rather than a shareholder pri-
10. JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005) (“The change
from traditional owners’ capitalism to the new managers’ capitalism is at the heart of what went
wrong in corporate America” during the early 2000s.).  The duty of care is not the only element
of the law that has shifted power to CEOs as a result of political power.  For example, the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 diminished the exposure of corporate managers
to private claims under the federal securities laws as a direct consequence of special interest
influence from the accounting industry and the business community. See Steven A. Ramirez,
Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as well as the
Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (1999).  Recently, management interests have trumped
the SEC’s efforts to break the stranglehold that management has over the proxy machinery and
therefore voting power within the public corporation.  Andrew Parker, It Is Time for a Transfer
of Power, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 2005, at 10 (stating that ferocious opposition from cor-
porate CEOs had stifled proxy reform, leading to management power over the director selection
process and higher compensation).
11. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 898-99 (Del. 1985).
12. Few commentators have written more incisively about Smith than Professor
Hamermesh.  Yet he does not mention the motion for reargument. See generally Hamermesh,
supra note 5; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477
(2000) [hereinafter Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom].  The harshest critics of Smith similarly
fail to recognize the joint defense pursued by Van Gorkom and the outside directors. See gener-
ally Manning, supra note 3.
13. The word “Chaos” as used in this paper is a term of art, referring to a science that has
emerged relating to certain mathematical models. PETER SMITH, EXPLAINING CHAOS 1 (1998).
There is no well-established corollary in law to Chaos Theory as it has developed within the
natural sciences.  Nevertheless, one may draw clear analogies between the science of Chaos The-
ory and law.  Chaos Theory may provide insights into legal dynamics that can assist in drawing
positive and normative conclusions regarding certain legal systems that seem to fit well within
the science of Chaos Theory.  This article submits that the duty of care applicable to public
corporations in the United States is such a doctrine. See Euel Elliott & L. Douglas Kiel, Intro-
duction, in CHAOS THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1-15 (L. Douglas Kiel & Euel Elliott eds.,
1997) (stating that Chaos Theory has been increasingly applied to social sciences such as eco-
nomics, political science, and sociology).  I intend to demonstrate that corporate governance is
subject to Chaos since its outcomes exhibit sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and slight
differences in conditions may lead to widely divergent outcomes in the content of corporate
governance. See id. at 6.
14. See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
503 (2000) (arguing that special interest influence permeates financial regulation, generally, and
corporate governance, in particular, due to public inattention which inevitably leads to political
overreaction when a crisis occurs).
15. James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207 (1988) (stating that, between April 1986 and
the middle of 1988, forty states responded to the application of gross negligence articulated by
Smith with insulating legislation aimed at reducing the risk of director liability for duty-of-care
violations).
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macy model.16  This was certainly not the intent of the Delaware Su-
preme Court, nor the various state legislatures that responded to
Smith by eviscerating the duty of care applicable to corporations in
the United States.17  That is the nature of Chaotic systems under
Chaos Theory: Small changes in initial conditions may give rise to rad-
ically different and unpredictable outcomes.18  This article seeks to
demonstrate that the stylized facts of Smith radically changed corpo-
rate governance in America in unpredictable ways.19
Part II of this article provides a new narrative for Smith.  Under
this new narrative, the outside directors are cast not as victims of an
ill-founded effort by the Delaware Supreme Court to re-write the law
of director liability, but are instead victims of a sub-optimal defense
strategy and a truly errant CEO.  Part III of this article traces the
devolution of corporate governance standards that followed in the
wake of Smith, in terms of its economic impact.  This devolution has
been marked by a march of ever more promiscuous standards of con-
duct for managers of public corporations, a march that has coincided
with the onset of CEO primacy in corporate America.  This article
concludes that this outcome was so unpredictable that perhaps Chaos
Theory, so prominent in modern science, may serve to deepen the un-
derstanding of how the legal system actually functions and provide a
lens that carries normative import.  The article concludes that the le-
gal system tends to demonstrate Chaos, at least within complex sys-
tems permeated by special interest influence governing areas such as
corporate governance.
16. Perhaps the most concise method of demonstrating the ascendancy of the CEO-centric
model of corporate governance that has taken hold since Smith would be to follow the money.
If compensation is the litmus test of CEO power, then the years since Smith suggest that CEO
power is on the upswing.  Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of U.S. Executive
Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 283 (2005) (finding that the proportion of S&P 500 profits
going to top executive compensation approximately doubled as a percentage of profits from 1993
to 2003).
17. The putative policy basis of insulating directors from liability for breaches of the duty of
care was a supposed directors and officers insurance crisis.  Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schi-
pani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1,
43 (1989). This seems odd given that profitability, as reflected in market value, for this line of
insurance carriers soared following the Smith decision. Id. at 48.
18. In Chaos Theory terminology, this is known as the butterfly effect.  The butterfly effect
stems from the notion that a butterfly’s wings in Beijing can influence weather systems on the
east coast of the United States in powerful ways. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCI-
ENCE 8 (1987).  This is why weather systems are impossible to predict.
19. For example, prior to Smith, directors were not frequently found answerable for “mere
negligence,” but liability did attach in bank cases, for gross negligence, and for directors who
could be termed mere figureheads.  Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095-96
(1968) (citing numerous authorities).  Indeed, Professor Bishop cited four cases in which direc-
tors were held answerable for negligence. Id. at 1099-101.  This relatively infrequent liability for
“mere negligence” was transmogrified in the wake of Smith into a rule of no liability in the
absence of intentional misconduct. See supra note 8.
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Chaos Theory is a mathematical concept that has its roots in the
study of weather systems.20  Edward Lorenz developed a meteorologi-
cal model using simple differential equations to explain atmospheric
convection.21  Lorenz found that minute variances in initial conditions
resulted in dramatic changes in the weather predictions yielded by his
model.22  This “sensitive dependence on initial conditions” is a mark
of Chaos.23  This element of Chaos is also known as the “butterfly
effect”—describing the possibility that a butterfly opening its wings in
China could impact the weather in faraway places.24  Another element
of Chaos is “large-scale order with small-scale disorder, of macro-pre-
dictability with . . . micro-unpredictability due to sensitive depen-
dence.”25  This element of Chaos has also been summarized as “order
out of chaos.”26  Specifically, while Chaos Theory suggests that unsta-
ble aperiodic behavior in deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems
defies detailed predictions of outcomes, certain patterns may emerge
from Chaos in a clear, even predictable way.27  Nevertheless, Chaotic
systems, although deterministic, defy control as a result of their micro-
unpredictability; Smith demonstrates the central point of this article.28
Chaos means law untethered to policy and a lack of real control by
any single lawmaking or regulatory authority—whether Congress,
management interests, the Delaware Supreme Court, or the various
state legislatures that responded to Smith.
II. RETHINKING SMITH
The most pungent element of the Smith case is the gross negli-
gence of Jerome Van Gorkom.  Van Gorkom was the CEO of Trans
20. SMITH, supra note 13.
21. Id. at 9-16.
22. Id. at 10 (“Lorenz . . . discovered (by accident!) that if he numerically integrated the
equations from minutely different . . . values then the values in the model after a relatively short
time would be very different—the model, that is to say, exhibits a sensitive dependence on initial
conditions.”); see also Edward N. Lorenz, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC
SCI. 130, 141 (1963) (concluding that because “of the inevitable inaccuracy and incompleteness
of weather observations, precise very-long-range forecasting would seem to be non-existant”).
23. SMITH, supra note 13 (emphasis omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
26. CHRISTOPHER R. WILLIAMS & BRUCE A. ARRIGO, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND JUSTICE:
CHAOS THEORY AND THE NEW (DIS)ORDER 15-34, 64-65 (2001).
27. STEPHEN H. KELLERT, IN THE WAKE OF CHAOS: UNPREDICTABLE ORDER IN DYNAMI-
CAL SYSTEMS 2 (1993). A dynamical system is simply one that changes over time.  Aperiodic
instability means the system does not repeat itself.  Nonlinear refers to sensitivity to initial condi-
tions.  Deterministic means that the system is not random. Id. at 3-4, 6.  Some commentators
add the concept of feedback to the definition, meaning that the output of the system influences
the next outcome. JOE PRITCHARD, THE CHAOS COOKBOOK: A PRACTICAL PROGRAMMING
GUIDE 32 (2d ed. 1996).
28. See Alvin M. Saperstein, The Prediction of Unpredictability: Applications of the New
Paradigm of Chaos in Dynamical Systems to the Old Problem of the Stability of a System of
Hostile Nations, in CHAOS THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 139 (L. Douglas Kiel & Euel Elli-
ott eds., 1997).
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Union Corporation, a publicly traded company, and had served in that
capacity for seventeen years.29  He was an officer of the company for
twenty-four years and was both a certified public accountant and an
attorney.30  As such, he had much experience in corporate acquisi-
tions.31  Van Gorkom was also intimately familiar with a fundamental
challenge facing Trans Union: It had more investment tax credits than
it could use because it was generating insufficient taxable income.32
Given this background, and his specialized knowledge, his behavior in
pursuing the sale of Trans Union is difficult to fathom.33
For example, Van Gorkom solicited the purchase of Trans Union
without any formal authorization from his board of directors to nego-
tiate the sale of the company, and without consulting with any other
senior officer of Trans Union, save one.34  Van Gorkom met with the
ultimate acquirer alone and opened negotiations without any legal
advice or other professional consultation.35  Indeed, Van Gorkom
opened negotiations by proposing the sale of the company for $55 per
share.36  His basis for this price was weak at best.37  While the price
29. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864-66 (Del. 1985).  Most commentators neglect to
focus on Van Gorkom’s individual expertise, background, and knowledge, just as they neglect to
focus upon his individual culpability. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW
AND ECONOMICS 274-304 (2002); GEVURTZ, supra note 7, at 274-320.  My focus upon Van
Gorkom’s conduct is central to my thesis.
30. Smith, 488 A.2d at 865-66.
31. Id. at 866.  “[I]n the late 1960s, and continuing through the 1970s, Trans Union pursued
a program of acquiring small companies.” Id. at 865.
32. Id. at 864.  Van Gorkom lobbied Congress to make the “ITCs refundable in cash.” Id.
at 864-65.
33. Of course, Van Gorkom’s specialized knowledge does not change the standard of care,
only its application. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958).  As a senior officer,
Van Gorkom may be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule to the extent he is
exercising business judgment. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (1992).
Nevertheless, the common law agency duties owed by Van Gorkom are not comprehensively
displaced by the business judgment rule.
34. Smith, 488 A.2d at 866.  A CEO only has apparent authority, at best, to undertake those
transactions that are in the ordinary course of business. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORA-
TIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 211-15 (9th ed. 2005) (demonstrating limited ap-
parent authority for corporate officers in general and CEOs in particular).  Van Gorkom also
seems to have had little actual authority in the sense that management submitted a five-year plan
to the board that did not include the option of selling the company. Smith, 488 A.2d at 865.
35. Smith, 488 A.2d at 866.  Professor Bainbridge suggests that Van Gorkom’s go-it-alone
strategy was “likely . . . quite damning” because it defied the economic basis for management
teams and for the existence of a multi-person board of directors.  “The take-away lesson is that
deal-makers should, early in the process, consult with senior management and get them ‘on
board.’” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 277.
36. Smith, 488 A.2d at 866.  Van Gorkom picked this price “out of the air”; in fact, he relied
upon a valuation study undertaken by the Trans Union CFO without speaking to that officer
about the differences between that study and the proposed transaction with the acquirer. BAIN-
BRIDGE, supra note 29, at 278.  When the CFO finally did learn of the deal, he thought the price
was too low. Id. at 277.
37. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 865.  “The well-advised board . . . obtains a fairness opinion that,
at least in theory, gives them some basis for evaluating what the prospective buyer could afford,
and would be willing, to pay.” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 279.  This conception of a fairness
opinion differs from seeking an opinion to justify a given price, and instead focuses on getting an
opinion as an aid to negotiating a price.  Additionally, Professor Bainbridge is not viewing the
fairness opinion as a tool to find any “intrinsic value.”  He expressly recognizes the problematic
nature of that term. Id. at 278.
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represented a substantial premium over the market price, it was pri-
marily based upon “rough form” analysis of the amount of debt the
corporation could sustain in the context of a leveraged buy-out.38  The
leveraged buy-out would not have impounded the value of the tax
credits held, but not fully utilized, by Trans Union due to its insuffi-
cient offsetting income.39  The Delaware Supreme Court found Van
Gorkom’s suggested price basis inadequate because the transaction
gave the acquirer complete control of the company.40
But, this inadequate price basis was only the beginning of Van
Gorkom’s gross negligence.  Van Gorkom signed the merger agree-
ment with the acquirer, Jay Pritzker, sight unseen at a social function,
without the benefit of any legal or financial review by Trans Union’s
senior officers or legal department.41  Van Gorkom instead retained
outside counsel James Brennan to represent Trans Union in this trans-
action.42  Brennan apparently gave the document only a cursory re-
view, even though the agreement was drafted by representatives of
the acquirer.43  To sign such an agreement without even reading it
seems almost unfathomable for any CEO, much less one with Van
Gorkom’s background.44  Moreover, the agreement undercut a central
feature of the transaction in terms of intent of the board to solicit
competing bids, resulting in the board’s inability to defend the reason-
ableness of its approval of the transaction.45  Specifically, the agree-
ment restricted both the ability of the board to solicit competing bids
38. Smith, 488 A.2d at 865.  Not only was the analysis for the wrong type of transaction, it
was a “very brief bit of work” that could only be termed a “preliminary study.” Id.  Trans
Union’s CFO, who supervised the study, called it a “very first and rough cut” that “did not
purport to establish a fair price for . . . the [c]ompany.” Id.
39. See id. at 865-66.  A leveraged buy-out is the use of debt to purchase a company, usually
using the firm’s assets to secure the debt; consequently, a leveraged buy-out results in less in-
come because the firm’s cash flow must service the debt. See JACK P. FRIEDMAN, DICTIONARY
OF BUSINESS TERMS 337 (1994).
40. Smith, 488 A.2d at 876-78.  “[T]he record compels the conclusion that . . . the board
lacked valuation information adequate to reach an informed business judgment as to the fairness
of $55 per share for sale of the [c]ompany.” Id. at 878.  “In fact, however, we do not know
whether the $55 per share was a good price for Trans Union’s stock; the court in [Smith] re-
mands for a determination of this issue.” GEVURTZ, supra note 7, at 286.  In other words, there
may have been a breach of the duty of care without any damages. Id. at 286 n.42.
41. Smith, 488 A.2d at 867, 869.  The company’s CFO did not know about the proposed
merger until the morning it was presented to the board. Id. at 869.  “Van Gorkom did not
consult with William Browder, a Vice-President and director of Trans Union and former head of
its legal department, or with William Moore, then the head of Trans Union’s legal staff.” Id. at
867.
42. Id.
43. Id.  “Pritzker’s lawyer was then instructed to draft the merger documents, to be re-
viewed by Van Gorkom’s lawyer, ‘sometimes with discussion and sometimes not, in the haste to
get it finished.’” Id.  It is unclear who this attorney was, but it appears to have been James
Brennan who Van Gorkom retained the next day to advise Trans Union on the legal aspects of
the merger. Id.
44. Id. at 865-66, 869.  “The [m]erger [a]greement was executed by Van Gorkom during the
evening of . . . a formal social event that he hosted for the opening of the Chicago Lyric Opera.
Neither he nor any other director read the agreement prior to its signing and delivery to
Pritzker.”  Id. at 869.
45. See id. at 878.
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and the availability of confidential financial information to other po-
tential suitors.46  Van Gorkom claimed that his failure to read the
agreement was mooted by the directors’ inherent right to approve or
disapprove a merger.47  The court, in a finding more consonant with
contract law, held that the agreement indeed had legal effect and
bound the company.48
Ultimately, the board voted to amend the agreement to preserve
the so-called market test.49  In particular, the board wanted to affirm
and clarify the “right to openly solicit offers.”50  Van Gorkom signed
the amendment, however, without assuring that it was in accord with
the intent of the board.51  The court opined that the amendments ac-
tually restricted the ability of the board to pursue competing bids.52
One director testified that if the market-test provisions were absent
from the documentation of the transaction, “then the management did
not carry out the conclusion of the [b]oard.”53  The court specifically
noted that Van Gorkom failed to assure that the documents he signed
incorporated the conditions imposed by the board.54  In all, the court
paints neither Van Gorkom nor attorney Brennan in a favorable light.
One is left to speculate whether the corporation had viable claims
against these two agents, which would have focused liability on those
most responsible for the losses.55
46. Id.  Only attorney Brennan had access to the agreement at the meeting where the board
approved the merger. Id. at 868 n.7.  Van Gorkom told the board that “[t]he ‘real decision’ is
whether to ‘let the stockholders decide it.’” Id. at 868 n.8.  Yet, Brennan apparently never ad-
vised the board that the agreement did not permit an unfettered auction of the company.  Thus,
the court’s finding that the agreement as executed furnished “no rational basis” for any market
test is tantamount to a finding that Brennan may have breached his duties to Trans Union. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958) (requiring disclosure of information “rele-
vant to affairs entrusted to [the agent]”).
47. Smith, 488 A.2d at 879.
48. Id. at 888.  Of course, a merger agreement signed by a CEO after board authorization,
that is not subsequently repudiated by the board, would bind the corporation in important as-
pects.  Indeed, just a short time after the Trans Union transaction with Pritzker, Texaco was
forced into bankruptcy after a court allowed a claim for tortious interference with contract in a
similar scenario. See Janet Elliott, Lasting Impact; Legal Anomaly; A Look Back at the Real
Trial of the Century, TEX. LAW., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1.  Thus, Van Gorkom’s belief that signing
agreements had little legal effect seems misguided at best.  In fact, at least one prospective bid-
der refused to bid against Pritzker unless the agreement were rescinded; when Pritzker refused,
the bidder withdrew. Smith, 488 A.2d at 870.
49. Id. at 882.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 883.  “[T]he amendments were considerably at variance with [board authoriza-
tion].” Id. at 870.  As such, it would appear that Van Gorkom exceeded his authority through
negligent—if not reckless—misconduct, and that the board could have pursued a claim against
Van Gorkom for violation of his duty of obedience. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 383, 385 (1958).
52. Smith, 488 A.2d at 883.
53. Id. at 879.
54. Id. at 883.  “Pritzker delivered . . . the proposed amendments to the September 20
[m]erger [a]greement.  Van Gorkom promptly proceeded to countersign all the instruments on
behalf of Trans Union without reviewing the instruments to determine if they were consistent
with the authority previously granted him by the [b]oard.” Id.
55. See supra notes 33-34, 36, 44, 46, 51, 54 and accompanying text.
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The court’s disposition of the motions for reargument demon-
strates why the corporation never pursued possible claims against Van
Gorkom and Brennan.56  The court granted director-defendant
Thomas P. O’Boyle leave for new counsel, who then moved individu-
ally for rehearing.57  O’Boyle’s new counsel argued that O’Boyle
should be considered individually because certain facts applied only to
him.58  The court rejected this argument as not timely asserted.59
Prior to filing the motions for reargument, counsel for all defend-
ants—Van Gorkom and the entire board—told the Delaware Su-
preme Court at oral argument that no basis existed for distinguishing
between Van Gorkom and the outside directors in terms of liability.60
The fact that the court specifically inquired into this issue suggests
some opportunity for the outside directors to distance themselves
from their errant CEO.61  In fact, the court raised this question after it
extended to the outside directors a “special opportunity” to present
any legal or factual arguments why any defendant should be treated
individually.62  Thus, the court premised its disposition of the case on
the fact that the joint defense “required [the court] to treat all of the
directors as one.”63  Given the depths of Van Gorkom’s negligence,
the most reckless decision of the outside directors may have been join-
ing their defense to Van Gorkom, particularly if we assume that they
were fully advised of the benefits and costs of so proceeding.64
This is not to say that facts supporting the liability of the outside
directors separate and apart from Van Gorkom did not exist.  The di-
rectors committed to selling the company after meeting for just two
hours, without prior notice of the nature of the meeting, and based
their decision primarily upon a twenty-minute presentation from Van
Gorkom.65  They too failed to read the operative agreements, acted
without any written summary of the transaction, and failed to assure
that the agreements were in accordance with their prior approval.66
In fact, they acted in a “total absence of any documentation whatso-
56. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 898-99.
57. Id. at 898.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 899.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 898-99.
63. Id. at 899.
64. Presumably, the joint defense would have triggered the applicability of a conflict of
interest analysis, along with the requirement that defense counsel obtain the informed consent of
each defendant. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003).  To the extent the
outside directors participated in a joint defense with Van Gorkom, they may be deemed to have
ratified or condoned Van Gorkom’s failure to assure that the agreements as executed accorded
with the transaction they approved. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 83-84 (1958) (stat-
ing that affirmance of a transaction gives rise to ratification).
65. Smith, 488 A.2d at 874.  The court thought the hurried consideration was inappropriate
in the absence “of a crisis or emergency.” Id.
66. Id. at 874, 878.
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ever.”67  Finally, it does not appear that the board was sufficiently in-
quisitive regarding the transaction; the board did not ask questions
about Van Gorkom’s basis for the price or other key elements of the
transaction.68  Notwithstanding these facts, Van Gorkom individually
botched the auction for the company—the most central cause of harm
to Trans Union’s shareholders.69  Given this core fact, it would seem
that the court overextended the definition of gross negligence to the
entire board.70  At the very least, the mere negligent conduct of the
board should not trigger liability for “gross negligence.”71
We will never know whether the outside directors would have
been liable if represented by their own counsel.  We also will never
know if the outside directors could have successfully cross-claimed
against Van Gorkom or impleaded claims against attorney Brennan
primarily because of the joint defense.72  Still, both the lower court as
well as two Delaware Supreme Court Justices believed that the de-
fendants were not grossly negligent.73  Moreover, at least one com-
mentator raised the possibility that the directors may have been
victims of attorney malpractice.74  Counsel Brennan advised the board
that they did not need a fairness opinion to support their decision and
that they would potentially face a lawsuit if they failed to approve the
transaction; however, the fairness opinion would have helped in their
defense when the board was ultimately sued for approving the trans-
action.75  Unfortunately, the joint defense precluded the full presenta-
67. Id. at 875.
68. Id. at 874, 877.
69. In fact, an actual offer of $60 per share was made, only to be withdrawn in the wake of
Van Gorkom’s “completely negative” reaction. Id. at 884-85.  This offer substantially exceeded
the amount per share yielded by ultimate settlement of the case. See EISENBERG, supra note 34,
at 561 (reporting settlement of $23.5 million); Smith, 488 A.2d at 864 n.3 (stating that there were
about 13 million Trans Union shares outstanding).  Some commentators argue in favor of re-
stricting officer liability. See Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability
and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45
WASHBURN L.J. 307 (2006).  Van Gorkom’s misconduct should give pause to those arguing in
favor of such an approach.
70. In tort parlance, it would appear that Van Gorkom’s botching of the auction was an
intervening cause that could potentially operate as a superceding cause of the harm to the share-
holders. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 186 (2000) (stating that an intervening cause is
one that occurs after a given defendant’s conduct, and that a superceding cause—one that is the
immediate or efficient cause—can relieve the defendant of liability).
71. “If enough fact finders in enough close cases are instructed they must find gross rather
than ordinary negligence, there will be in all likelihood a greater number of defense verdicts.”
GEVURTZ, supra note 7, at 286.
72. Brennan’s firm represented defendants in the litigation. Smith, 488 A.2d at 880.  The
rules of professional responsibility preclude an attorney from representing parties with directly
adverse interests. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003).  Thus, the attorney repre-
senting all of the defendants in Smith could not counsel the outside directors regarding potential
wrongdoing by Van Gorkom or Brennan.
73. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting); id. at 898 (Christie, J., dissenting).
74. GEVURTZ, supra note 7, at 296 n.60 (stating that counsel’s “failure to warn the directors
that they were about to breach their duty by acting on inadequate information clearly raises the
issue of malpractice”).
75. Smith, 488 A.2d at 868.  It would have been particularly helpful if the directors had
supported their position with a fairness opinion to guide their negotiations with the acquirer,
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tion of this claim because Brennan was a member of the defense firm
in the Smith litigation.76  It is doubtful that the outside directors would
have been found grossly negligent if they had distanced themselves
from Van Gorkom and asserted claims against attorney Brennan.77
Regardless of whether the outside directors would have been
found grossly negligent if defended individually, the fact remains that
they did pursue a joint defense with Van Gorkom.  The news of their
liability supposedly shocked the business leadership community, as
well as the insurance industry, leading to a concerted effort to elimi-
nate duty-of-care liability.78  Shortly after the Smith decision, Dela-
ware enacted section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation
Act,79 which for the first time permitted management to disclaim lia-
bility for monetary damages for the breach of the duty of care through
a provision in the corporate charter.80  These provisions spread
throughout the United States, and today the vast majority of states
have provisions that in varying degrees diminish, or completely elimi-
nate, liability for breach of the directors’ duty of care.81  The breadth
of these provisions is often such that even an infinitely negligent direc-
tor—a director who does absolutely nothing—like the defendant in
Francis v. United Jersey Bank,82 would not be liable for monetary
damages to the corporation.83  In terms of public corporations, ac-
rather than simply to justify the ultimate price. See supra note 37.  Thus, counsel’s advice was at
best misleading and incomplete.  Similarly, because the directors faced potential suits regardless
of their decision, both parts of counsel’s advice were misleading and incomplete.
76. Smith, 488 A.2d at 880.
77. Other commentators have opined that the facts of Smith support a finding of gross
negligence, without explicitly considering the possibility of an independent defense. See supra
notes 1, 6.
78. GEVURTZ, supra note 7, at 315-16.
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
80. Id.  According to Professor Steinberg, it took only “a few months” for clamoring corpo-
rate fiduciaries to prevail upon the Delaware legislature to pass the insulating statute.  Steinberg,
supra note 8, at 920.
81. See Hanks, supra note 15.
82. 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981) (holding a director who “never made the slightest effort to
discharge any of her responsibilities” liable for breach of the duty of care).
83. There are only four exceptions to the insulating effect of section 102(b)(7).  Directors
may still be liable for monetary damages for: 1) breach of the duty of loyalty; 2) acts or omissions
not in good faith; 3) unlawful dividends; and 4) transactions in which the director received an
improper benefit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).  Delaware law states the following:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intention-
ally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corpora-
tion, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where
the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating
a conscious disregard for his duties.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, slip op. at 124-25 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005),
available at http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/(ymaqvrn5bplq3n45izvbwx55)/download.aspx?
ID=64510.  It is notable that this formulation of good faith requires intentional wrongdoing.
Notwithstanding the legal rhetoric, and in contrast to Professor Bishop’s 1968 finding of few
cases of liability, no director has been found to have been liable for breach of the duty of care
since the Smith decision.  Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside
Director Liability 6 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Program, Working Paper No. 250, 2003), availa-
ble at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=alea.
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cording to Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh, a very high percentage
have eliminated duty-of-care liability pursuant to a charter provision
authorized under section 102(b)(7) or similar provisions under other
state laws.84  Thus, these statutes have rendered claims for breach of
the duty of care “essentially obsolete.”85  “The evisceration of the
duty of care is a drastic step in the corporate governance frame-
work. . . . Such expansionist state legislation . . . may portend the de-
velopment that states and corporate fiduciaries fear—the adoption of
federal legislation.”86
In the end, the Smith decision itself seems to have left corporate
law and the duty of care where it began.87  If the duty of care means
anything in the context of corporate fiduciaries, it must at a minimum
mean that such fiduciaries should not sign high-stakes agreements
without reading them or comprehending their terms.88  Van Gorkom
did this, and the board condoned it by joining his defense; finding lia-
bility under these facts should have been as shocking as finding gam-
bling at Rick’s Cafe´ Americain.89 Smith cannot be termed a major
change in the law or in the risks facing directors, particularly outside
directors who, unlike the directors in Smith, effectively distance them-
selves from errant CEOs.90  Indeed, aside from giving real meaning to
the term “gross negligence,” by finding some directors liable, the case
seems unremarkable, except to illustrate the risks of pursuing a
joint defense strategy with a very negligent individual.91  Understood
84. Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, supra note 12, at 490 (finding that 98% of sampled
Fortune 500 companies that incorporated under state laws that permit insulation of directors for
duty-of-care liability had adopted insulating charter provisions, and that 100% of Delaware firms
sampled had adopted such provisions).
85. Id.
86. Steinberg, supra note 8.
87. See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974) (finding that the
business judgment rule did not protect directors who recklessly accepted a “grossly inadequate”
price for the sale of the company), aff’d, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Penn Mart Realty Co. v.
Becker, 298 A.2d 349 (Del. Ch. 1972) (holding that allegations of gross negligence against direc-
tors stated a claim).  The concept that directors could be held liable for negligence was hornbook
law in 1985. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 234 (3d
ed. 1983) (stating that “negligence . . . precludes application of the ‘business judgment’ rule”).
88. This apparently occurred twice.  First, Van Gorkom signed the original merger agree-
ment without reading it.  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 869 (Del. 1985).  Second, with
respect to the amendments to the merger agreement, “Van Gorkom promptly proceeded to
countersign all the instruments . . . without reviewing [them] to determine if they were consistent
with the authority previously granted him by the Board.” Id. at 883.  Van Gorkom’s misconduct
“had the . . . effect of locking Trans Union[ ] . . . into the Pritzker [a]greement.” Id. at 884.
89. I refer to the scene from Casablanca, where Captain Renault expresses shock at finding
gambling at Rick’s Cafe´ Americain, at the moment he collects his winnings. CASABLANCA
(Warner Bros./First National 1942).
90. See Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 2, at 430 (“We disagree with the suggestion that the
[Smith] holding is ‘new law.’ . . . [W]e contend the case merely represents a reiteration of existing
Delaware law.”); see also Steinberg, supra note 8, at 919 n.3 (collecting authorities assessing the
novelty of Smith).
91. If anything, liability for negligent directing was not expansive enough before Smith. See
Bishop, supra note 19, at 1099 (“The search for cases in which directors of industrial corpora-
tions have been held liable . . . is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large
haystack.”).  Professor Bishop was no friend of efforts by management to insulate themselves
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through the lens of the motion for reargument, Smith thus raises the
question: If it does not stand for a major change in law and therefore
does not materially enhance the risks facing directors, then why did it
spur such a “drastic” response in terms of corporate governance?92
This article asserts that the duty of care for corporate directors fell to
the special interest influence of business managers, resulting in an eco-
nomically sub-optimal corporate governance regime.
III. WHAT HAS SMITH WROUGHT?
Part II demonstrated that the reaction to Smith was overblown, in
the sense that the evisceration of the duty of care within public corpo-
rations was a radical change in the nation’s corporate governance re-
gime, and nothing in Smith was a sufficient basis for drastic change.
This part will seek to demonstrate that in the wake of Smith, insulat-
ing legislation in the form of statutes such as section 102(b)(7) are
economically sub-optimal93 and therefore create pressure for further
legal response.94
There are many indications that the legacy of Smith is in fact an
economically sub-optimal result.  First, there is evidence suggesting
that investors pay less for shares in companies that insulate their di-
rectors from liability for duty-of-care provisions and for shares in cor-
porations operating under governance regimes that permit such
from liability and would have looked askance at section 102(b)(7): “In sum, I think that the
practice of protecting corporate executives against litigation and liability has now been carried
about as far as it ought to be carried and perhaps a little farther.” Id. at 1103.  He specifically
concluded that directors and officers should be held liable for those rare instances of “gross
negligence.” Id.  He also noted that many corporate fiduciaries had historically been held liable
for breaching the duty of care, particularly in bank cases. Id. at 1095-96.  In all, Professor Bishop
finds numerous cases holding boards answerable for some form of negligence, but with a rela-
tively limited frequency, including “four such specimens” he terms “recent.” Id. at 1099; see also
supra note 82.
92. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 928-29.
93. I use the term “economically sub-optimal” in both a microeconomic and
macroeconomic sense.  From a microeconomic efficiency perspective, if investors face more risks
of diversion—or excessive agency costs—in investing in equity markets, then it will be more
costly to entice them to invest.  Thus, the risk that managers will exploit infinitely careless boards
to expropriate higher compensation will naturally lead to an unnecessarily higher cost of capital
within corporate America or will cause investors to supply capital on less favorable terms. See
Castro, et al., supra note 8, at 1131-35, 1166-68.  Managers are likely to exploit boards if the legal
infrastructure surrounding the corporation encourages a void in board diligence.  The excess cost
of capital will lead to fewer wealth-enhancing investment transactions.  Macroeconomically,
growth will be impaired in any nation that permits an excessive cost of capital because of the
crucial role that capital accumulation and innovation play in macroeconomic performance.
Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of Investor Confi-
dence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 41-42 (2002); see also Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 2, at 445
(“There are additional purposes to be served by the evolution . . . of American . . . corporate law,
besides those of pure economic efficiency and the minimization of transaction costs.  One is to
insure the continued confidence of investors . . . . The rules of law relied upon in [Smith] admira-
bly serve that function.”).
94. Professor Steinberg predicted this result soon after the race to permit infinitely careless
directors commenced. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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insulation.95  Second, one study assessed the influence of twenty-four
key elements of corporate governance, including the presence of pro-
visions insulating directors from duty-of-care liability, upon stock mar-
ket valuation.  The study found that companies with inferior corporate
governance were valued at inferior levels.96  The economic sub-op-
timality of eliminating the duty of care for directors further undercuts
any argument that shareholders approve such charter amendments in
any meaningful fashion; management simply exerts too much control
over the proxy process to assume shareholders are approving such ec-
onomically destructive provisions.97  Further evidence of the sub-op-
timality of Smith’s legacy is found in the executive compensation
arena, when the carelessness of directors manifests itself in enhanced
power and soaring executive compensation levels for CEOs.98
Executive compensation in the United States has long been a
point of scholarly debate.  An overview of the legal context of execu-
tive compensation is necessary to understand the fundamentally
CEO-indulgent legal framework governing compensation decisions.
First, the business judgment rule operates to insulate compensation
issues from any searching judicial review.99  Second, compensation de-
cisions have traditionally enjoyed an even higher degree of such insu-
lation.100  Third, if compensation is approved by shareholders, the
decision will invariably stand, essentially immune from judicial re-
view.101  Fourth, votes to secure shareholder approval are manipu-
lated in favor of management in many powerful ways.102  Fifth, CEOs,
95. Bradley & Schipani, supra note 17.
96. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,
118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 107 (2003).  There is also little basis for concluding that Delaware law gener-
ally has a positive effect on firm value. Id.;  Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware
Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 33 (2004) (finding that while there is evidence that smaller
Delaware firms have enjoyed enhanced value at times, this effect has disappeared at other times,
and is non-existent for “larger firms, which comprise 98% of the sample” of Delaware firms;
“[t]hus the Delaware effect ‘disappears’ when examined over time and when examined for firms
that are economically meaningful”); see also Ramirez, supra note 14, at 572 (“[I]nvestors neither
care about nor have the ability to judge the state of incorporation and the impact that this has
either upon their rights or profits.  There is therefore little empirical evidence showing that mar-
kets integrate a state of incorporation or change in corporate governance into stock prices.”).
97. Steinberg, supra note 8, at 927; see infra notes 102-03.
98. Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 113-15
(2004).  Seligman asserted that lax state fiduciary duties contributed to “a dramatic increase in
the ratio of the compensation of the corporate CEO to that of the average corporate blue collar
employee.  In 1980, this ratio was 42 to 1; . . . by 2000, it was estimated to be at least 475 to 1.”
Id. at 114.
99. Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 100 (1992) (arguing that courts should cease using the business
judgment rule to shield excess compensation in all cases).
100. Id. at 82 (stating that in many cases “since the turn of the [twentieth] century, courts
have . . . applied the business judgment rule and endorsed the compensation practice”).
101. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.03 (1992) (requiring a showing of
waste to set aside compensation approved by shareholders).
102. See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder
Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735 (2003).  Professor Joo identifies
the following impediments to shareholder voting power: federal proxy rules that prohibit inclu-
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who generally control board membership, are in no way impaired in
selecting compensation committee members, who for a variety of so-
cial and cultural reasons are likely to be very sympathetic to claims for
higher, more generous compensation packages.103  After Smith, abso-
lute non-liability for monetary damages may be included in this very
pro-CEO legal framework with respect to compensation issues.104
Given this framework, it should come as no surprise that executive
compensation has soared since Smith.105 Simply stated, Smith’s legacy
has allowed agency costs to run amok.106
These agency costs transcend excessive compensation.  The com-
pensation package that often led to the highest pay-outs, the option
plan, created perverse incentives at the height of the public cor-
poration in America.107  These incentives encouraged officers to
fraudulently manipulate and inflate their share prices.108  Thus, many
commentators suggest that the compensation crisis fueled the recent
series of corporate scandals.109  According to respected business lead-
ers, these incentives operated to create a historic crisis in investor
confidence, which had macroeconomic significance.110  “Boards of di-
rectors became lax in performing their historical duty to monitor com-
sion of shareholder proposals relating to board membership within management’s proxy, mean-
ing dissident shareholders must bear the steep costs of their own proxy challenge; and
authorization of brokers to vote shares within client accounts—invariably voting with manage-
ment—unless they receive contrary instructions. Id. at 758-60.
103. Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity
Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1589-
91 (2004).  One commentator has stated that the incidence of electoral challenges to incumbent
management is “extremely rare” and that the incidence of successful challenges is “practically
negligible.”  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Oct. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=829804.
104. See supra note 83.
105. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 16, at 283 (showing that executive compensation has
doubled from 1993 to 2003, as a proportion of profits of the S&P 500); see also INST. FOR POLICY
STUDIES & UNITED FOR A FAIR ECON., EXECUTIVE EXCESS 1, 4 (2005) (reporting that the ratio
of CEO to average worker pay went from 107 to 1 in 1990 to 431 to 1 in 2004).
106. See Michael Jensen & William Menkling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976) (“It is generally impossi-
ble for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal deci-
sions from the principal’s viewpoint.”).  The problem of agency costs within the corporation has
bedeviled shareholders and scholars from the very incipiency of corporate power. JOHN MICK-
LETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY xviii (2003).
107. See Douglas Guerrero, The Root of Corporate Evil, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2004, at
37 (“It appears that . . . highly placed executives used their power . . . to achieve financial targets
fraudulently, boost the stock price, and further enrich themselves via compensation schemes that
rewarded those achievements.”).
108. Id.
109. See Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hear-
ing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of
Chairman Alan Greenspan), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/july/
testimony.htm (stating that lax boards had contributed to a CEO-centric corporate power struc-
ture that permitted senior executives to “harvest” gains through manipulation of share prices).
110. THE CONFERENCE BD., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 6
(2003) (finding that excessive compensation, resulting in part from lax monitoring by boards, led
to an “unprecedented” loss of investor confidence).
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pensation.”111  The problem of excessive compensation further
demonstrates that the destruction of the duty of care cannot be eco-
nomically justified.  It materially contributed to the macroeconomic
instability arising from the failure of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Global
Crossing, and others during 2001 and 2002.112
I do not argue, however, that Smith alone led to these scandals.
There is no logical reason why special influence would be so neatly
contained within the doctrine of the duty of care.  Instead, Smith’s
legacy is found in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA),113 which has been identified as a prime example of the use
of campaign contributions to influence the law.114  The accounting in-
dustry and the high-tech sector backed the PSLRA by funding a $29.6
million war chest.115  “[T]he PSLRA merely rigs private securities
claims so that defendants almost always win.”116  Commentators have
noted other elements of state law which tilted the field in favor of
management and against shareholders.117  Former Securities and Ex-
change Commission Chair Arthur Levitt has further catalogued a se-
ries of battles he waged in the 1990s against monied interests in efforts
to protect investor rights and hold management more accountable.118
The influential voice of management and affiliated groups prevailed,
and the rights of shareholders were restricted at virtually every
turn.119 Smith, therefore, sparked changes in the legal structure of the
corporation that effectively passed massive power from shareholders
111. Id.
112. Seligman, supra note 98, at 112-16 (identifying lax state fiduciary standards, along with
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), as key legal elements underlying
the corporate scandals of 2001 to 2002).
113. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
114. Ann Reilly Dowd, Look Who’s Cashing in on Congress, MONEY, Dec. 1997, at 128, 132
(listing the PSLRA as the top example of how money drives legislation).
115. Id.; see also Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous,
and Now Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV.
3, 24 (1996) (stating that money from accounting and high tech industries backed the PSLRA).
116. Ramirez, supra note 10, at 1093.  Since the PSLRA, courts have dismissed a greater
percentage of securities cases and not a single one had made it to trial as of 2002.  Seligman,
supra note 98, at 112.
117. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49
MD. L. REV. 947, 949 (1990) (“The most distinctive aspect of the last decade in corporate law
was the celerity with which traditional constraints on corporate managers weakened.”).
118. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 106-15 (2002) (recounting how “the business
lobby” and “CEOs” successfully used Congress and the SEC to thwart an effort by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board to require that options be expensed on corporate income
statements).
119. Levitt details one hard-fought investor victory, the independence of the Financial Ac-
counting Foundation, which oversees the promulgation of accounting standards. Id. at 111-15.
Levitt acknowledges, however, that such victories were dwarfed by setbacks such as the one
suffered when the SEC attempted to secure auditor independence. Id. at 127.  Levitt recounts in
great detail his struggle to impose greater auditor independence upon the accounting industry;
ultimately, he had to settle for watered-down rules that the industry found acceptable, after
Congress threatened the SEC with budget cuts. Id. at 127-39.  The relationship between auditor
Arthur Andersen and Enron is one example of the importance of auditor independence.  Enron
failed amidst a sea of accounting scandals.  An independent auditor may have mitigated this
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to CEOs.120  This transfer of power, exemplified in voting control over
the corporation and compensation paid to top executives, created a
CEO-primacy model of corporate governance.121
The recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act has also failed to rem-
edy the deficiencies left in the wake of Smith.122  In fact, there is a
growing consensus that this Act rests upon an unstable policy founda-
tion.123  The Act does not restore the duty of care and does virtually
nothing to directly limit executive compensation.124  Rather, the Act
seems to rely on criminal law by imposing harsh sentences on execu-
tives convicted of white-collar crimes.125  Even if criminal sanctions
are properly calibrated such that the punishment fits the crime, it is
doubtful that such sanctions alone can provide sufficient deter-
rence.126  Thus, while the macroeconomic threats posed by the
meltdown in investor confidence from the summer of 2002 have sub-
sided, the underlying risks that led to that market dysfunction remain
unabated.127  Events since the passage of the Act support this central
point.
disaster.  Andersen actually received more in consulting fees ($27 million) than audit fees ($25
million). Id. at 139-43.
120. Naturally, the politics and ideology of the current governing coalition is a material fac-
tor in the content of any legal changes. See Seligman, supra note 98, at 100 (“After the Republi-
can Party gained control of both houses of Congress in the 1994 elections, the movement for
private securities litigation reform took on a greater urgency.  An earlier debate about whether
empirical evidence justified curtailing the private securities class action was succeeded by the
triumphant certitude of an ideological majority.”).
121. See supra notes 16, 102-03.
122. See INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES & UNITED FOR A FAIR ECON., supra note 105, at 1
(showing that in 2003 executive compensation was 301 times the pay for an average worker,
while in 2004 it was 431 times the average worker’s pay).
123. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Gov-
ernance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1594 (2005) (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act corporate govern-
ance reforms were costly and “poorly conceived”).
124. Ramirez, supra note 93, at 67.
125. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 410-11 (2003) (providing an overview of
the criminal provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and concluding that cultural factors may still
operate to dilute law enforcement efforts).  I am skeptical that law enforcement resources will
continue to be devoted to white-collar crime in a fashion that would assure a constant deterrent
effect.  In addition, given that the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world,
any further criminalization must be deemed suspect. See Growth of U.S. Prison Population
Slows, USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 2005, at 3A, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/08/09/
prison.population/ (stating that U.S. incarceration rate of 724 per 100,000 is 24% higher than any
other nation, and that young black men are seven times more likely to be incarcerated than
young white men).
126. At best, relying on criminal sanctions over private litigation is a relatively untested ap-
proach. See also Seligman, supra note 98, at 137 (arguing that criminal enforcement is not usu-
ally appropriate for assuring sound corporate accountability because sanctions must be
“calibrated to the nature of the violation”).
127. Id. (“Only when boards consistently believe they have something to lose from quies-
cence are they likely to be a fully effective check on self-interested or non-law-compliant senior
management.”).
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For example, in the fall of 2005, the largest independent futures
broker in the United States suffered a catastrophic “flameout.”128
The CEO of Refco Group Limited concealed $430 million in debts
that he owed Refco through entities under his control, leading to his
indictment for securities fraud.129  Refco had just consummated an ini-
tial public offering of its shares in August of 2005, raising $583 mil-
lion.130  This public offering would have triggered the full applicability
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but not until the company filed its periodic
reports.131  Refco was also a member of the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change and was therefore regulated by the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission.132  The SEC exercised supervisory authority
over the Refco public offering as well as the Refco securities broker-
age units.133  Moreover, the audit firm of Grant Thornton was re-
quired to audit the firm’s books in accordance with the new Sarbanes-
Oxley regime governing audits of public firms.134  Finally, numerous
underwriters, including Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, and Credit
Suisse First Boston, would each have been subject to the “due dili-
gence” requirements of federal securities laws, as would have any
other professionals associated with the public offering such as the
firm’s legal counsel.135  Yet, despite abundant oversight and the appli-
cability of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, hundreds of millions of dollars
in bad debts owed by the firm’s CEO were not uncovered before
thousands of public investors were fleeced of over $1 billion.136  The
message to public investors is that “[t]here is no way you can rely on
an auditor or an investment bank for a seal of approval or a guarantee
of no chicanery . . . . The lesson to be learned from Refco is that you
must do sleuth work yourself.”137
It is difficult to imagine a more inefficient reality or a more dan-
gerous source of macroeconomic instability.138  Essentially, public in-
128. Peter Robison, Bennett’s Refco Scheme Exposed by Late-Night Hunch: “It Hit Me,”
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 27, 2005, http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=
aKGJd31_yYQM&refer=news_index#.
129. Susan Diesenhouse, Ex-CEO Charged in Refco Scandal, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 2005, § 3,
at 1.
130. Id.
131. Michael Rapoport, Moving the Market—Tracking the Numbers/Outside Audit: Refco’s
Sarbanes-Oxley Loophole, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2005, at C3.
132. Susan Diesenhouse, Refco’s Fall Continues; Brokerage Unit to Shut, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15,
2005, § 3, at 1.
133. Id.
134. Jim Peterson, Who to Blame for Refco?, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 22, 2005, at 15 (call-
ing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act a “gigantic redundancy”).
135. Emily Thornton, Refco: The Reckoning, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005, http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958095.htm (quoting Professor John Coffee:
“[O]ur current system of due diligence by underwriters seems to be dysfunctional”).
136. Diesenhouse, supra note 129.
137. Thornton, supra note 135 (quoting “veteran money manager” Michael F. Holland at
Holland & Co.).
138. The efficient market hypothesis is premised upon the fact, or hope, that all material
information is impounded into market prices.  If investors cannot be assured that they have
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vestors must do the job of the board in monitoring management and
finances of a public company.139  Investors must find what the board
has missed.140  This harsh, even ridiculous, notion flows directly from
the fact that directors may be infinitely careless under the mainstream
approach to director duties of care under state corporate law.141
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a failure.142  Refco proves that it will
not serve to deter careless boards, slovenly management, and collusive
expropriation and diversion of shareholder wealth.143  Indeed, the Act
is even worse than a mere failure: It imposes significant costs upon all
public firms without regard to whether management and boards are
conducting themselves appropriately.144  These substantial costs have
deterred firms from staying public, as well as deterred firms from go-
ing public.145  This can only mean that the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms are
both costly and ineffective: The Act is therefore a miserable failure.146
This failure was foreseeable.147  The Act simply ignored the bene-
fits of private litigation.148  The benefits include the following: the cre-
ation of private “incentives to ferret out” fraud that public
investigators miss; private enforcement immunity from political influ-
ence; the probability that investor remedies are more likely to repair
investor confidence than mere criminal or administrative remedies;
and the lack of any public financing requirement for enforcement effi-
cacy.149  There was no recognition of the possibility that the duty of
sufficient information to support investment decisions, the thesis collapses. See Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991).  Obviously, concealed information
hidden from public view, like the loans to the Refco CEO, cannot be impounded into market
price. See Burton Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, THE WORLD
OF ECONOMICS 211-18 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1991). Similarly, if
investors believe that information is not available or is not sufficiently reliable to support their
investment decisions, the additional risks they face from this uncertainty will require compensa-
tion, leading to a higher cost of capital and impaired macroeconomic growth.  Ramirez, supra
note 93, at 41-46.
139. Obviously, this is impossible; directors are vested with ultimate management power and
investors are not. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).  In addition, directors have
broad information rights within the corporation. E.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE § 3.03 (1992).  Shareholders have more limited information rights that frequently require a
court action to pursue. E.g., Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 118 (Del. 2002)
(holding that a shareholder must show “the documents are necessary and essential to satisfy the
stockholder’s proper purpose” for examining corporate books and records).
140. See supra note 83.
141. See supra notes 15, 83.
142. The central purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was “to protect investors by improving
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures.” H.R. REP. NO. 107-610, at 1 (2002) (Conf.
Rep.), as reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 542, 542.
143. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
144. See Romano, supra note 123, at 1587-89.
145. Id. at 1589.
146. A Price Worth Paying?, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2005, available at http://www.economist.
com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3984019 (reporting that a survey of CFOs found that on
average firms were paying $2.4 million more for audit services after Sarbanes-Oxley).
147. Ramirez, supra note 93, at 64 (raising the prospect that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be
“a political fraud on the investing public”).
148. Id. at 63-65.
149. Id. at 65.
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care could be reinvigorated.150  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act ignored a
fundamental economic maxim: “When a legal actor runs a risk of lia-
bility, the legal actor is most likely to carefully weigh the conse-
quences of each professional judgment.”151  This is true even though
duty-of-care litigation does not impose costs to all public compa-
nies.152  By any reasonable analysis, duty-of-care liability was excep-
tional.153  Nevertheless, many experts recognized the centrality of
careless directors to virtually all of the major corporate scandals driv-
ing the Sarbanes-Oxley reform effort.154  Indeed, even noted business
leaders admitted that a “massive failure in corporate governance” oc-
curred in the first few years of this century, as “too many directors
don’t take their responsibilities seriously.”155  A limited notion of
duty-of-care liability can hardly be termed untested;156 it had been the
law for decades.157
A full analysis of the costs of a CEO-centric model of corporate
governance must account for foreseeable events such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.158  Once the law was fully twisted into a CEO-primacy re-
gime, it was only a matter of time before a major crisis would explode;
such a regime is economically unsustainable because it will lead to
high agency costs, diversion, and impaired investor confidence.159
Specifically after the PSLRA, it was clear that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
was “a betrayal of the policy foundations of the federal securities laws
150. See id. at 62-65.
151. Seligman, supra note 98, at 126.
152. The concern is that directors that are essentially un-tethered to any duty-of-care incen-
tive will not expend sufficient effort to be careful when the benefits of that effort flow to share-
holders generally. See Ramirez, supra note 93, at 61-62.
153. See supra notes 19, 82, 87, 90-91.
154. “Go back to all of those corporate scandals, and it comes down to a board that missed
warning signals.”  Kurt Eichenwald, In String of Corporate Troubles, Critics Focus on Boards’
Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, at A1 (quoting Charles Elson, director of the Weinberg
Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware).  Indeed, “sleepy” boards have
become “commonplace” across America; the onset of provisions such as section 102(b)(7) gave
legal sanction to such careless boards; thus, sleepy boards should be expected. Id. at A30 (quot-
ing Stephen Davis, president of Davis Global Advisors, a global corporate governance consult-
ing firm).
155. Carol Hymowitz, How to Fix a Broken System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R1 (quot-
ing former Medtronic CEO William W. George, who also serves on the board of three major
public firms).
156. The argument in favor of a more searching, ordinary negligence standard of liability is
logically compelling. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 7, at § 4.1.3.  No commentator has effec-
tively explained why other professionals should be held liable for professional negligence, but
directors should not. Id.  Nevertheless, in the absence of empirical data in favor of an ordinary
negligence standard of liability, it is doubtful that a narrow window of liability, like that which
existed before Smith, is economically unsound.  The pre-Smith approach, combined with more
generous remedies for investors under the federal securities laws, seems to have controlled
agency costs and secured investor confidence from 1934 through the 1990s.  Ramirez, supra note
93, at 60 n.168.
157. See supra notes 19, 82, 87, 90-91.
158. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (finding that scandals and market disruptions generally lead to
new financial legislation).
159. See supra notes 9-10, 16, 83, 93, 102-03, 105-06, 122.
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and a threat to the long term stability of our securities markets.”160
Professor Marc I. Steinberg made a similar prediction regarding the
evisceration of the duty of care.161  It is difficult to justify the oblitera-
tion of the duty of care or a CEO-primacy model of corporate govern-
ance on economic grounds; no empirical evidence suggests that
permitting directors to be infinitely negligent is economically
sound.162  On the other hand, there are strong economic, particularly
macroeconomic, reasons for concluding that some duty-of-care obliga-
tion makes economic sense.163  Moreover, history suggests that too
much management power, without appropriate limitations on discre-
tion, could impose macroeconomically catastrophic costs.164
Given the lack of any economic foundation, the lack of any other
rational policy foundation, and the circumstances surrounding
Smith,165 special interest influence remains as the only plausible expla-
nation for the evisceration of the duty of care.166  The Delaware legis-
lature acknowledged that the insurance industry’s purported crisis was
a central concern when it added section 102(b)(7), amending the Del-
aware General Corporation Act.167  No commentator predicted the
revolution in corporate governance that occurred after Smith.168  This
unpredictable outcome was amplified by America’s system of corpo-
rate federalism, with Delaware acting early to preserve its position as
the leading jurisdiction for public companies, and dozens of states fol-
lowing Delaware.169
Our system of corporate governance—buffeted as it is by
macroeconomic events, special interest influence, corporate federal-
ism, and even international competitive pressures—defies prediction
and is not always subservient to the underlying policy dynamics that
160. Ramirez, supra note 10, at 1093.
161. Steinberg, supra note 8.
162. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 241-304.  Professor Bainbridge offers a theoretical con-
struct suggesting that Smith created incentives for transactions that are “over-processed” be-
cause directors can spend other people’s money to protect themselves from liability. Id. at 282.
The converse is also true: Directors who are allowed to be infinitely negligent will have dimin-
ished incentive to expend time protecting other people’s corporate value.  Thus, the obliteration
of the duty of care will lead to many under-processed transactions. See supra note 83.
163. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
164. Seligman, supra note 98, at 112-16 (finding that the following factors cumulatively con-
tributed to the “year of scandals” in 2001 to 2002: 1) the underfunding of the SEC; 2) the lax
state fiduciary duties governing directors and officers; 3) the compromised integrity of account-
ing standards; and 4) the PSLRA).
165. GEVURTZ, supra note 7, at §§ 4.1.3, 4.1.7 (searching in vain for a policy basis for limiting
duty-of-care liability and statutory exoneration provisions).
166. There is little doubt that corporate managers have significant power over the terms of
corporate governance.  For example, business interests were recently able to stop the SEC’s
efforts to achieve incremental reform of the proxy system.  Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, A
Legacy that May Not Last, BUS. WK., June 13, 2005, at 38 (discussing business lobbying efforts to
derail proxy reform).
167. Bradley & Schipani, supra note 17.
168. Steinberg, supra note 8, at 919-20.
169. Id. at 920.
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putatively govern the legal framework in this crucial arena.  Dean Joel
Seligman noted that the “pendulum quite recently has swung quite far
and quite suddenly in a regulatory direction” with the enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but this was prompted by a swing of “the
pendulum far too aggressively in a deregulatory direction.”170  Profes-
sor Roberta Romano stated “that legislating in the immediate after-
math of a public scandal or crisis is” apt to produce “poor public
policymaking” that is dominated by “better-positioned . . . policy en-
trepreneurs” instead of “careful and balanced consideration of the is-
sues.”171  In short, the law of corporate governance is controlled by
Chaos.172 Smith shows how seemingly insignificant facts, like the joint
defense strategy, may have a durable and deep impact on the law of
corporate governance,173 meaning that sensitivity to initial conditions
is satisfied.174  Like other Chaotic systems, corporate governance ex-
hibits macro-predictability with micro-unpredictability because special
interest influence seems to result in predictable overreaching, which in
turn leads to crisis and overreaction in very unpredictable ways.175
Commentators have recognized the potential role of Chaos The-
ory in the law, but few have considered controlling Chaos within the
law or identifying legal paradigms that may need to be restructured to
ameliorate Chaos.176  It is not that corporate governance lacks order;
on the contrary, there is a powerful pattern of laxity followed by crisis,
followed by political pressure for federal intervention.177  The system
defies prediction, and relatively minor changes lead to radical and ill-
founded outcomes.178  The system seems to lack any central nervous
system, which means that coherence and law tethered to sound policy
is compromised.  Perhaps the law should strive to reduce Chaos within
the corporate governance system.  It is time for scholars to focus on
improving the institutional structure underlying corporate governance
170. Seligman, supra note 98, at 116 n.99.
171. Romano, supra note 123, at 1602.
172. See Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
329, 331 (1993).
Chaos Theory concerns the phenomenon of “orderly disorder created by simple
processes.”  It is the notion that the laws of the physical world cannot predict what is
going to happen in the future.  This is not because the laws are invalid, but because
even when we understand interactions . . . results in specific cases still can be impossible
to predict—even though recurring patterns are discernible and remarkably durable.  In
sum, there is chaos in order, and there is order in chaos.
Id.
173. See supra note 7.
174. See supra text accompanying note 23.
175. See supra text accompanying note 25.
176. Scott, supra note 172, at 348-51 (applying Chaos Theory to longstanding problems of
jurisprudence); see also Edward S. Adams, Gordon B. Brumwell & James A. Glazier, At the End
of Palsgraf, There Is Chaos: An Assessment of Proximate Cause in Light of Chaos Theory, 59 U.
PITT. L. REV. 507, 508 (1998) (applying Chaos Theory to argue in favor of a new approach to
proximate cause).
177. See supra note 10; supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
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law, rather than the precise substance of corporate law.  Simply put,
the issue may be how to construct a system of corporate governance
tethered to policy and science rather than swinging like a wild
pendulum.179
IV. CONCLUSION
Smith led to the death of the duty of care for directors of public
corporations in the United States.  Nothing in Smith justifies this
“drastic” change in American corporate law.  On the contrary, once
Smith is viewed in accordance with the narrative proffered in this arti-
cle, it fails to explain the death of the duty of care, since the case did
not change the law or the risks facing directors.  This suggests that the
death of the duty of care following in the wake of Smith was not the
product of a highly interventionist court, which required legislative
constraint, as many commentators suggest.  Moreover, the destruction
of the duty of care within the vast majority of public companies is a
radical development.  Combined with increased laxity in constraints
on management of public corporations with respect to other issues of
corporate governance, such as the PSLRA, Smith’s legacy left us with
a most radical outcome—the onset of CEO primacy in the American
public corporation.
This article suggests that the onset of CEO-primacy was caused
by special interest influence and the exploitation of corporate federal-
ism.  Special interests, namely corporate managers and the insurance
industry, were able to exploit Smith to achieve results that were puta-
tively in their interest.  The PSLRA was also the product of special
interest influence.  CEO-primacy is manifest in empirical data show-
ing that CEOs—not shareholders—select board directors, and in em-
pirical studies showing that the share of profits going to senior
executive compensation has doubled since Smith.  Excessive laxity in
legal constraints has now resulted in excessive CEO power.  It also
resulted in political reaction—the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Unfortunately, the end result of political overreaction may not be
beneficial.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act greatly increased the cost of ac-
cessing the public capital markets upon all issuers without improving
the quality of corporate governance.  The system has shifted from wild
indulgence to wild over-regulation.  This fact suggests that the under-
179. I have made two proposals, each of which could reduce Chaos within the system of
corporate governance for public firms.  One proposal is to give a depoliticized agency broad
authority to articulate best corporate governance standards in accordance with economic sci-
ence, much as the Federal Reserve Board has power over monetary policy.  Steven A. Ramirez,
The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Legal Structures to Secure a Race to the
Top (Dec. 15, 2005) (working paper, on file with author).  Another proposal is to require that
senior executives and board members be professionals, subject to a professional self-regulatory
agency, akin to the securities brokerage industry.  Ramirez, supra note 9.
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lying legal structure of our corporate governance system results in
standards and laws that are difficult to predict and are untethered to
any policy analysis.  The system seems best explained by Chaos The-
ory.  Macro-predictability accompanies micro-unpredictability, and
the system seems very sensitive to small changes in conditions.  Cor-
porate governance scholars should refocus their energy from the con-
tent of specific rules or standards to the creation of a legal structure,
which could reduce Chaos and place corporate governance on a more
stable and scientific foundation.
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